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The Modern Slavery Act 2015 s.45 provides a defence for individuals compelled to 
commit a criminal offence because of slavery and/or exploitation. Many offences, 
including murder, are excluded from the ambit of this defence. In cases where s.45 
does not apply, reliance must be placed on duress and necessity, prosecutorial 
discretion, and the power to stay a prosecution. These approaches are heavily 
circumscribed in murder cases where duress and necessity are inapplicable, the fact 
that there has been a killing tends towards prosecution and the power to stay is 
invoked in exceptional circumstances. The introduction of s.45 and the approaches 
to be adopted where the defence does not apply provides an opportunity to consider 
afresh whether a (partial) defence to murder based upon compulsion ought to be 
available. A review of domestic law suggests that failure to provide a (partial) 
defence is based on policy and possibly confusion regarding the excusatory nature of 
duress. This article advances a bespoke partial defence for slavery/human trafficking 
victims who kill based upon compulsion, which would sit cogently alongside the 
Modern Slavery Act 2015 s.45. 
 
Introduction 
By introducing a defence for slavery/human trafficking victims who commit an 
offence because of exploitation, the Modern Slavery Act 2015 s.45 (s.45) is the first 
law in the UK to transpose international obligations towards trafficking victims in this 
context.1 Schedule 4 contains a list of over 100 excluded offences, for example, 
murder, manslaughter, assisting unlawful immigration, etc. This exclusion has been 
criticised because trafficking victims are vulnerable to committing several of the 
excluded offences.2 The murder exclusion has received little attention, possibly 
because such cases are likely to be rare. The victim testimonies of Sanyu 
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1 Joseph [2017] EWCA Crim 36; [2017] 1 Cr. App. R. 33 (p.486) at [2] per Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd CJ. 
2 For discussion see, Hansard, Public Bill Committee Debates, Modern Slavery Bill, col.386 (11 September 2014). See 
also, K. Laird, “Evaluating the Relationship between Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the Defence of Duress: 
An Opportunity Missed?” [2016] Crim. L.R. 395, 396–397. 
  
and Holly, considered below, illustrate that although such cases may be rare they 
raise wider issues of legal principle. 
It is important to note that international law, and specifically art.26 of the Council of 
European Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings which requires 
“the possibility of not imposing penalties on victims for their involvement in unlawful 
activities, to the extent that they have been compelled to do so”3 does not provide 
absolute immunity from prosecution for trafficking victims, but it requires 
alternative options to imposing liability in some circumstances.4 Where 
s.45 does not apply, according to Lord Thomas CJ, international obligations are met 
through: the common law duress/necessity defences; prosecutorial discretion 
guidelines; and/or the power of the court to stay a prosecution for abuse of process.5 
These alternative options are heavily circumscribed in murder cases where 
duress/necessity are inapplicable,6 the serious nature of the offence tends towards 
prosecution, and a stay for abuse of process applies in exceptional circumstances. A 
murder conviction carrying life imprisonment imposed without recourse to victim-
perpetrator status, save (possibly) in the context of determining the minimum tariff,7 
could, if the elements of murder are satisfied, apply to trafficking victims who kill. 
The introduction of s.45 (a hybrid of duress by threats and of circumstances8) 
and the approaches to be adopted where the defence does not apply provides an 
opportunity to consider afresh the debate regarding whether a (partial) defence to 
murder based upon compulsion ought to be available. A review of domestic law 
suggests that failure to provide a (partial) defence in England and Wales is based on 
policy and possibly confusion regarding the excusatory nature of duress. This article 
seeks to address the imbalance in domestic law, which lacks an applicable (partial) 
defence for an offence where the mandatory life sentence applies. In doing so, an 
entirely bespoke partial defence for slavery/human trafficking victims who kill, 
aligned to s.45 and drawing upon earlier Law Commission and Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on the Modern Day Slavery Bill (Joint Committee) proposals, is 
advanced. 
 
Modern Slavery Act 2015 s.45. 
Section 45 introduced separate defences for victims of human trafficking over and 
under the age of 18.9 For adults, the section operates where the person performs 
the criminal act because they were compelled to do so; the compulsion is 
attributable to slavery or relevant exploitation; and a reasonable person in the same 
 
3 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. See also, N [2012] EWCA Crim 189; 
[2013] Q.B. 379; [2012] 1 Cr. App. R. 35 (p.471). 
4 N [2012] EWCA Crim 189; [2013] Q.B. 379; [2012] 1 Cr. App. R. 35 (p.471) per Lord Judge CJ commenting on art.26 
of the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings (see also Directive 36/2011 [2011] 
OJ L101/1). 
5 Joseph [2017] EWCA Crim 36; [2017] 1 Cr. App. R. 33 (p.486) at [20(i)]. 
6 See the exceptional case of Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) (No.1) [2001] 2 W.L.R. 480; [2000] 
H.R.L.R. 721 CA where the Court of Appeal ruled on the separation of conjoined twins which would result in the 
inevitable death of one of the twins. 
7 Criminal Justice Act 2003 Sch.21. 
8 Laird, “Evaluating the Relationship Between Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the Defence of Duress: 
An Opportunity Missed?” [2016] Crim. L.R. 395, 396–397. 
9 For an excellent analysis of s.45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, see, Laird, “Evaluating the Relationship Between 
Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the Defence of Duress: An Opportunity Missed?” [2016] Crim. L.R. 395. 
  
situation as the person and sharing the person’s relevant characteristics would have 
no realistic alternative to doing the act. A person may be compelled to do something 
by another person or by circumstances.10 Compulsion is attributable to slavery or to 
relevant exploitation if it is a direct consequence of a person being, or having been, 
a victim of slavery or a victim of relevant exploitation. The term exploitation includes: 
slavery, servitude, and forced or compulsory labour; human trafficking; sexual 
exploitation; removal of organs; securing services by force, fraud or deception; and, 
securing services by children or vulnerable individuals.11 The defence for under-18s 
is similar except there is no need to establish compulsion or the absence of a 
realistic alternative providing the criminal conduct was a direct consequence of 
being, or having been, a victim of slavery or relevant exploitation.12 Relevant 
characteristics to be considered include age, sex, and any physical or mental illness 
or disability.13 A reverse burden of proof applies to the defence.14 Section 45 is not 
retrospectively applicable,15 and Sch.4 excludes many offences, including murder, 
and manslaughter. 
 
Trafficking victims who kill innocents 
Real life victim testimonies of people like Sanyu and Holly, derived from the US 
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, demonstrate the unfairness 
associated with failing to provide a (partial) defence for victims of trafficking 
compelled to kill because of the situation. The following text is taken directly from the 
report: 
When Sanyu’s friend moved from Uganda to the UK [UAE—in the Trafficking 
Report], she told Sanyu she had found her a job that would even cover her travel 
expenses. Sanyu agreed to join her friend. Only a few days after arriving, her friend 
disappeared and Sanyu’s situation changed drastically. A woman came to Sanyu’s 
house and demanded Sanyu repay her for covering her travel expenses. The woman 
explained Sanyu would need to sell herself for sex. When Sanyu resisted, the 
traffickers tortured her, denied her food, and made her sleep outside for three 
weeks. She was trapped in a house with 14 other girls from Uganda and forced to 
have sex for money.16 
The following text outlines a hypothetical ending to Sanyu’s situation for the 
purposes of this article. Sanyu resolved to comply with the traffickers’ demands to 
avoid further torture. Sanyu was forced to witness other girls being beaten, and 
starved. One girl, Kamali, continuously refused to cooperate, and Sanyu overheard 
one of the more violent traffickers, Bale, say he would kill Kamali, and anyone who 
tried to defend her if she was defiant again. The girls were afraid of Bale due 
10 Modern Slavery Act 2015 s.45(1)(b)–(d) and (2). 
11 See the definitions provided under Modern Slavery Act 2015 s.3. See, generally, s.45(2)(a)–(b) and (5). For 
discussion see, J. Collins, “Exploitation of Persons and the Limits of the Criminal Law” [2017] Crim. L.R. 169. 
12 The “situation can become so normalised for children that they have no idea whether they are being forced to do 
something or not. If interviewed and questioned about what they thought, the chances are that they would not give the 
right answer to allow the defence to take place”; Hansard, Public Bill Committee Debates, Modern Slavery Bill, col.376 
(11 September 2014) per Sarah Teather. 
13 Modern Slavery Act 2015 s.45(4). 
14 See http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/human_trafficking_and_smuggling/#a20 [Accessed 26 June 2017]. 
15 Joseph [2017] EWCA Crim 36; [2017] 1 Cr. App. R. 33 (p.486) at [4].16 See 
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2016/index.htm [Accessed 26 June 2017]. 
  
to his violent outbursts, and his psychotic reputation. When Kamali refused orders 
the following evening, Bale pushed Kamali to the floor and started kicking her in the 
stomach and head. Bale caught Sanyu’s eye, and said “well don’t just stand there, 
join in”. Fearing for her own life, Sanyu also started kicking Kamali. It is unclear 
whose kick caused the death. 
Sanyu could be convicted on secondary liability principles. To be convicted of 
murder, Sanyu must have intentionally assisted or encouraged Bale to act, with the 
requisite intent for murder. Sanyu’s foresight may provide convincing evidence she 
intended to assist or encourage Bale in the intentional killing.17 Bale might receive a 
reduced sentence if his “psychotic reputation” is linked to a recognised medical 
condition, for which he might claim diminished responsibility; a manslaughter 
verdict and sentencing discretion would follow a successful diminished 
responsibility plea. The murder exclusion under Sch.4 means that s.45 would not 
assist Sanyu. Sanyu would still be at risk of conviction for murder, and a mandatory 
life sentence. The potential applicability of s.45 is different in the case of Holly 
below, where it would be relevant to the theft but not the killing. The following text 
is taken from the US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report directly with 
the exception of the theft which has been inserted for the purposes of the article: 
Holly didn’t recognise Emilie on Facebook, but seeing they had mutual friends, 
accepted her friend request. Holly and Emilie chatted and quickly became online 
friends. One day Emilie told Holly that her boyfriend, Karl had found them both jobs 
that would make them a lot of money. Emilie asked Holly to come to her apartment 
that weekend. When Holly arrived, Emilie, her boyfriend, and another man told 
Holly she had to have sex with men for money, in addition to stealing valuables 
from certain clients. When Holly refused, they threatened to hurt her seriously, and 
told her that if she ever attempted to escape they would kill her. They posted 
photos of Holly on an escort website and took her to different cities to have sex with 
paying clients.18 
The following text outlines a hypothetical ending to Holly’s situation for the 
purposes of this article. One evening, in addition to supplying sexual services, Holly 
was advised to collect money owed to Karl from V for drugs. This was not an 
uncommon practice. V was unsympathetic to Holly’s situation. When Holly left V’s 
premises, she handed the money together with a stolen watch to Karl who was 
waiting outside. Karl who had been drinking and takings drugs flew into a rage 
claiming that V owed him more money. He told Holly he was sick of her allowing 
people to underpay. He handed her a knife and told her to slash V’s face to make an 
example of what they would do to those who did not pay. Holly pleaded with Karl to 
change his mind, but this only served to anger Karl more. He told Holly that if she 
did not kill V, he would kill her. Holly looked around and realised that there was no-
one who could help. She reluctantly, and fearing for her life, returned to V’s 
premises. When V let her in, she stabbed him repeatedly in the chest knowing that 
she would seriously injure him. V died as a result.19 
17 Jogee [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681 [2016] 1 Cr. App. R. 31 (p.485) at [87]. 
18 See http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2016/index.htm, full report at p.36 [Accessed 26 June 2017]. 
19 For full details see: http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2016/index.htm full report at p.36 [Accessed 26 June 
2017]. 
  
Joseph 
Lord Thomas CJ outlined the approach where s.45 does not apply in six conjoined 
appeals in Joseph. None of the cases involved unlawful killing, but the ruling is 
important in establishing the approach to offences excluded by Sch.4.20 The 
Competent Authority (the Modern Slavery Human Trafficking Unit)21 designated 
applicants in five out of six appeals as human trafficking victims.22 According to Lord 
Thomas, international obligations are met through: the common law 
duress/necessity defences; prosecutorial discretion guidelines; and, the power of 
the court to stay a prosecution for abuse of process.23 However, I would argue that 
the absence of a (partial) defence fails to recognise the stigma attached to the 
murder conviction and the inherent unfairness in imposing a mandatory life sentence in 
cases like that of Sanyu and Holly. 
The Court of Appeal was urged by Anti-Slavery International, as Interveners to 
the case, to re-assess the approach it had previously adopted in relation to 
trafficked victims who commit offences because of exploitation.24 It was argued that 
duress should be developed, narrowly and within the confines of human trafficking, 
to accommodate trafficking victims who would be eligible to rely on 
s.45 “but for” its lack of retrospective application,25 i.e. individuals who had 
committed offences not excluded under Sch.4. The common law defence of duress 
requires: the defendant was (or may have been) impelled to act by a reasonable 
belief that the coercer would kill or cause serious injury to the defendant if he or 
she did not commit the act; and a person of reasonable firmness sharing relevant 
characteristics of the defendant would have responded in the same way.26 Lord 
Bingham in Hasan27 set the parameters of the defence: (i) duress is not a defence to 
murder, attempted murder and possibly some forms of treason28; (ii) the threat 
must be of death or serious injury; (iii) the threat must be directed at D, D’s 
immediate family or someone to whom D might reasonable regard themselves 
responsible; (iv) the reasonableness of D’s perception and conduct engages an 
objective assessment; (v) D’s conduct must have been a direct cause of the threats 
relied upon; (vi) there must have been no evasive action which D could have been 
expected to take; (vii) D may not rely on duress to which he has voluntarily laid 
himself open. 
Whether duress should be extended to accommodate trafficking victims was 
considered in Dao,29 where the court was “strongly disinclined to accept that a 
threat of false imprisonment suffices … without an accompanying threat of death 
20 Joseph [2017] EWCA Crim 36; [2017] 1 Cr. App. R. 33 (p.486) at [20(i)]. 
21 The Modern Slavery Human Trafficking unit is the Competent Authority charged with assessing referrals made by 
police, local authorities and NGO’s. The Home Office Visas and Immigration is the second UK Competent 
Authority which considers referrals identified in the immigration process. 
22 Joseph [2017] EWCA Crim 36; [2017] 1 Cr. App. R. 33 (p.486) at [6]. 
23 Joseph [2017] EWCA Crim 36; [2017] 1 Cr. App. R. 33 (p.486) at [20(i)]. 
24 Joseph [2017] EWCA Crim 36; [2017] 1 Cr. App. R. 33 (p.486) at [24]. 
25 Joseph [2017] EWCA Crim 36; [2017] 1 Cr. App. R. 33 (p.486) at [25]. 
26 Graham [1982] 1 All E.R. 801 at 805–806 per Lord Lane. See also, Howe [1987] A.C. 417; (1987) 85 Cr. App. 
R. 32. 
27 Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 A.C. 467; [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 22 (p.314) at [21]. 
28 Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 A.C. 467; [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 22 (p.314) at [21] See also, Howe [1987] A.C. 
417; (1987) 85 Cr. App. R. 32; and, Gotts [1992] 2 A.C. 412; [1992] 1 All E.R. 832; (1992) 94 Cr. App. R. 312. The 
defence is also possibly excluded in relation to some forms of conspiracy; Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim. L.R. 570. 
29 Van Dao [2012] EWCA Crim 1717 referred to Joseph [2017] EWCA Crim 36; [2017] 1 Cr. App. R. 33 (p.486) 
at [29]. 

  
or serious injury.” Widening the duress defence in this manner was deemed “ill-
advised”.30 Approving of the ruling, Lord Thomas CJ in Joseph explained: the scope 
and limits of duress are set out in cases of the highest authority; Parliament enacted 
s.45 without providing for retrospective application; and, it would require “clear 
injustice” to justify a court amending the law of duress to extend its applicability.31 
Gross LJ outlined four reasons for retaining the narrow approach in Dao. The first 
three were practical concerns: difficulties in disproving the defence once raised32; the 
potential for criminals to manufacture the defence33; and, lack of sufficient 
safeguards to prevent misuse of a widened duress defence.34 These difficulties 
should not be underestimated, but they should not rule out extending the defence. 
The fourth reason, a justification for retaining the status quo, that justice can be 
achieved in sentencing, even where the defence fails35 does not have the same effect 
in cases like that of Sanyu and Holly where the mandatory life sentence applies. 
 
Prosecutorial discretion 
The trafficking/slavery victim who kills will be subject to the usual Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) considerations in deciding whether to prosecute. The CPS 
must assess whether there is reason to believe the person is a slavery victim, and it 
is anticipated that this determination will be resolved after collaboration between 
the CPS and the Competent Authority.36 The CPS decides whether to proceed with a 
prosecution. The CPS will make this determination after considering the potential 
application of s.45. The category of case under discussion is where Sch.4 excludes 
the offence from the purview of s.45, and where the offence would fall under s.45 
but for the defence’s lack of retrospective application, i.e. where the offence was 
committed pre-2015 Act implementation. In such cases, prosecution should not occur 
where there is clear and credible evidence of duress, (unless the case is one of 
murder where duress remains inapplicable). In the absence of such evidence, but 
where there is evidence of compulsion through exploitation, the CPS must assess 
whether the public interest lies in prosecution.37 A prosecution will usually take 
place, subject to sufficient evidence, unless public interest factors tending against 
prosecution outweigh those in favour.38 In some instances the nature of the offence 
charged will render it in the public interest to prosecute the trafficked person.39 For 
Holly, the CPS should discontinue a theft charge, but the gravity of the offence of 
murder tends to favour charging. If a case involving more than one offence reaches 
trial, jurors may have the unenviable task of considering a combination of disparate 
defences, and the relevance of trafficking status will depend on the offence 
charged; slavery status would be relevant to the theft but 
30 Van Dao [2012] EWCA Crim 1717 at [33]. 
31 Joseph [2017] EWCA Crim 36; [2017] 1 Cr. App. R. 33 (p.486) at [28]. 
32 Van Dao [2012] EWCA Crim 1717 at [45]. 
33 Van Dao [2012] EWCA Crim 1717 at [46]. 
34 Van Dao [2012] EWCA Crim 1717 at [47]. 
35 Van Dao [2012] EWCA Crim 1717 at [48]. See also, D. Ormerod, “R. v Dao: duress - extent of duress” [2013] Crim. 
L.R. 234. 
36 Joseph [2017] EWCA Crim 36; [2017] 1 Cr. App. R. 33 (p.486) at [5] and [15]. 
37 See http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/human_trafficking_and_smuggling/#a20 [Accessed 26 June 2017]. 
38 See https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/code_for_crown_prosecutors/codetest.html [Accessed 26 June 2017]. 
39 Joseph [2017] EWCA Crim 36; [2017] 1 Cr. App. R. 33 (p.486) at [6]. 
  
not the killing. If the client survived, s.45 would not apply to the serious bodily 
harm suffered, but duress of circumstances would potentially be available.40 In the 
murder/serious bodily harm binary divide “[l]iability goes from zero to the 
maximum, all depending on the victim’s physiological powers of recovery. This 
should not be the result”.41 The mandatory life sentence and stigmatising effect of 
the murder conviction should elevate this type of case beyond others in terms of 
reform.42 
 
Stay of prosecution 
A stay of prosecution though technically available would be unlikely to assist Sanyu 
and Holly. The court may stay a prosecution where proper consideration has not 
been provided in bringing that prosecution.43 The Court of Appeal in L explained: “In 
some cases the facts will indeed show that the defendant was under levels of 
compulsion which mean that, in reality, culpability was extinguished”.44 
Nevertheless, the court should not “substitute its own judgement for that of the 
prosecutor”,45 and the power of the court to stay a prosecution is invoked in 
exceptional circumstances only.46 Under the old provocation defence, there was 
evidence that stays were granted in cases involving domestic violence, and given 
similarities across the experiences of victims of domestic violence and trafficking 
victims, considered below, there may be a temptation to extend this practice to 
trafficking cases.47 Critical of this practice in provocation cases, the Law Commission 
observed: 
“It is unsatisfactory that the [domestic violence] cases could only be treated as 
manslaughter by prosecutorial discretion which involved turning a blind eye to the 
law with the connivance of the judge.”48 
In the trafficking context, the argument that a murder prosecution would be stayed 
seems unconvincing (given that evidence of duress would be inadmissible) at trial.49 
Moreover, the analogy with provocation is imperfect since that at least provided a 
partial defence. 
Section 45 and the common law regime are ill-equipped to deal with 
slavery/trafficking victims who kill. Given the murder label, and the mandatory life 
sentence attached, it is essential that special consideration is afforded to those 
faced with an “odious Hobson’s choice” between killing an innocent and protecting 
40 The Law Commission posited a similar example: D1 would have a defence to the torture of D2 where duress is 
established, but D2 would have no defence if D2 kills in response to threats from D1; The Law Commission, A New 
Homicide Act for England and Wales? (2005), Law Com. CP No.177, paras 7.36–7.43, 7.10. 
41 S.J. Mulroy, “The Duress Defence’s Unchartered Terrain: Applying it to Murder, Felony Murder, and the Mentally 
Retarded Defendant” (2006) 46 San Diego L. Rev. 159. 
42 The Law Commission, Report on Defences of General Application (1977), Law Com. No.83, para.2.43 cited by The 
Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences Against the Person and General Principles (1993), Law Com. 
No. 218, para.30.17. 
43 Van Dao [2012] EWCA Crim 1717 at [20]. 
44 L [2013] EWCA Crim 991; [2014] 1 All E.R. 113; [2013] 2 Cr. App. R. 23 (p.247) at [33] per Lord Judge CJ. 
45 LM [2010] EWCA Crim 2327; [2011] 1 Cr. App. R. 12 (p.135) at [19]. 
46 Attorney General’s Reference (No.1 of 1990) [1992] Q.B. 630; (1992) 95 Cr. App. R. 296, CA; Attorney General’s 
Reference (No.2 of 2001) [2003] UKHL 68; [2004] 2 A.C. 72; [2004] 1 Cr. App. R. 25 (p.317), HL. 
47 The Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder (2004), Law Com. No.290, paras 3.105–3.106. 
48 The Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder (2004), Law Com. No.290, para.3.107. 
49 Lynch [1975] A.C. 675 at 685: “Reliance on executive discretion is not adequate in principle or in practice”; The Law 
Commission, A New Homicide Act for England and Wales? (2005), para.7.19. 
  
themselves from death or serious bodily harm.50 For Sanyu and Holly, the 
exploitation precipitates a state of “metaphorical involuntarism”,51 operating on the 
actor’s “free choice” capacity, thereby repudiating “fair opportunity” to conform to 
the requirements of the law.52 The conduct is “wrongful”, but the actor is not 
“morally responsible”.53 In Holly’s case, for example, the theft is unjustified, but 
excusable, and, it is appropriate that s.45 and duress are available. The duress 
defence is the paradigm of concession to human frailty.54 The question should be 
“whether the juror believes it unfair to punish the person, given the threatening 
circumstances, for having chosen the wrong option”.55 
This apparently neat theoretical underpinning, concededly more useful in moral 
than legal categorisations,56 is sometimes obscured where attempts are made to 
treat as justifications matters that are really excuses.57 This arises most vividly in the 
conflation of necessity and duress principles.58 Predicated on the lesser of two evils 
approach, the utilitarian calculus of necessity represents a justification on grounds 
that the conduct was good, better or more tolerable than the alternative.59 Duress 
does not engage a balancing exercise (provided the threshold test of a threat of death 
or serious harm has been satisfied) but recognises the wrongfulness of the conduct, 
and compassionately excuses the actor because he is “a normal person in an 
abnormal situation…it [is] impossible to separate him from ourselves”.60 The nature 
of the threat, commonly utilised to separate duress from necessity claims, has been 
described by the House of Lords as a “distinction without a relevant difference”,61 
and rejection of necessity as a defence to murder underpins the equivalent 
approach to duress.62 
It is not axiomatic that a full defence ought to be available where an actor’s 
“hard choice” response to emotional pressures was “understandable” or, at least, 
“socially comprehensible”.63 Just as societal values seek to excuse, the seriousness of 
the crime may mean it is not “inevitably hypocritical for a juror to concede that most 
people in the same situation, including the juror would have acted as the 
50 A. Reed, “Duress and Normative Moral Excuse: Comparative Standardisations and the Ambit of Affirmative 
Defences” in A. Reed, M. Bohlander, N. Wake and E. Smith (eds), General Defences in Criminal Law: Domestic and 
Comparative Perspectives (Ashgate Publishing, 2011), p.93. 
51 S. Kadish, “Excusing Crime” (1987) 79 Calif. L. Rev. 257, 265. 
52 J. Dressler, “Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code” (1987–
1988) 19 Rutgers Law Journal 671, 701–702. 
53 M.N. Berman, “Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality” (2003) 53 Duke L.J. 1, 7. 
54 L.E. Chiesa, “Duress Demanding Heroism and Proportionality: The Erdemovic Case and Beyond” (2008) 
41Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 741. 
55 J. Dressler, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
p.286. See also, Chiesa, “Duress Demanding Heroism and Proportionality: The Erdemovic Case and Beyond” (2008) 
41Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 741, 751. 
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defendant did, yet still believe the actor deserved to be punished”.64 A juror might 
“expect people to manifest the utmost moral strength … when they are playing a 
part, even a minor role, in an especially barbaric scenario, such as the Holocaust”.65 It 
is wrong, however, to ignore victim-perpetrator status entirely, as would occur in 
relation to the killings in the cases of Sanyu and Holly. 
Loss of control and diminished responsibility 
Repeal of the mandatory life sentence would assist in ensuring that weight is 
attached to the victim-status of trafficked persons who kill, but the stigmatising 
murder label would remain inappropriate.66 The suggestion by the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee on the Modern Slavery Bill (Joint Committee) that a 
partial defence be made available to trafficking victims who kill did not meet with 
universal approval.67 Evidence submitted to the Joint Committee included some 
preference for the “prosecutorial discretion status quo” on grounds that “no such 
statutory defence is available for drug mules, or, in relation to terrorism for those 
who assist in terrorist offences through fear, threat or coercion”.68 It was also 
advocated that any statutory defence ought to be aligned with duress, which remains 
unavailable to murder.69 
Some slavery/trafficking victims who kill may have existing partial defences 
available to them under the present law: for example, where D suffers a recognised 
medical condition, and/or where D kills a trafficker in fear of serious violence or in 
response to a justified sense of being seriously wronged. As with the preceding 
scenarios, the following victim testimonies are derived from the US Department of 
State, Trafficking in Persons Report. These scenarios illustrate the potential 
applicability of the partial defences. The following analysis also highlights potential 
difficulties Holly and Sanyu might experience in relying on the partial defence of loss 
of control. Importantly, where the elements of the partial defence(s) are satisfied, 
murder would reduce to manslaughter, and discretion in sentencing would follow. The 
following victim testimony is taken from the US Department of State, Trafficking in 
Persons Report directly: 
When a British-Nigerian couple offered to take Paul, 14 years old, from Nigeria to 
the UK, enrol him in school, and pay him to perform housework, he accepted. Once 
in Britain, however, the family changed his name and added him to their family 
passport as an adopted son. They forced him to clean their house for as many as 17 
hours each day for no pay and did not allow him to go to school. They took his 
passport, set up cameras to monitor his movements, and limited his contact with 
the outside world. Paul tried 
64 J. Dressler, “Exegis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits” (1989) 62 
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68 Joint Committee, Draft Modern Slavery Bill Report (2013–2014), p.57. 
69 S. Bird and P. Southwell, “Does the new “slavery” defence offer victims of trafficking any greater protection?” 
(2015) Arch. Rev, 7, 9. 
  
several times to escape; once he contacted the police, who told him they did not 
handle family matters.70 
The following text proffers a hypothetical ending to Paul’s situation for the purposes of 
this article. After being refused help by the police, and being taunted for his failed 
escape attempts, depressed and despondent Paul lost self-control, grabbed a knife 
from the kitchen and stabbed his exploiters to death.71 As with the preceding 
testimony the following is taken from the US Department of State, Trafficking in 
Persons Report directly (the name Paul has been changed to John to avoid any 
confusion with the earlier scenario included in this article): 
When Adelaide and John hit hard times, John suggested his wife consider 
prostitution for a year or two to supplement their income. Adelaide agreed, but 
when she wanted to quit, John forced her to continue. He took away her keys and 
cell phone, and would not let her leave the house or care for their son. He listed 
her on four escort websites, controlled what she wore and ate, and collected all the 
money she earned. John used psychological coercion and threatened Adelaide to 
keep her in prostitution; when she threatened to leave, he vowed he would find 
her.72 
The following text outlines a hypothetical ending to Adelaide’s situation for the 
purposes of this article. Petrified of what her abuser would do to her son if she 
tried to leave, Adelaide poisoned her husband’s drink, inducing a fatal overdose.73 
Note that in both scenarios, unlike the cases of Sanyu and Holly above, there is a 
relational link between the victims and the perpetrator. Home Office guidance 
explicitly refutes the myth that modern day slavery does not occur where the 
“organiser and victim are related, married, living together or lovers”.74 Familial 
relationships, such as those identified in the cases of Paul and Adelaide, are often 
utilised to “exploit and control others”.75 For example, the Home Office explained: 
“there have been numerous incidents where ‘boyfriends’ have groomed women and 
children into sexual exploitation or family members have colluded (intentionally or 
unintentionally) in the exploitation.”76 
In instances where there is no familial link between the trafficker and the victim, 
the experiences of a trafficked person may be likened to the experiences of an 
individual who suffers familial abuse. Terms, such as, “threats, force, coercion, 
control, abuse of power, exploitation, patterns of harm and entrapment” have been 
used to depict both trafficking and familial abuse.77 Similarities across the 
behaviours of traffickers and perpetrators of familial abuse include “multiple 
intimidation, coercion and compulsion not only through threats of actual physical 
70 See http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2016/index.htm, full report, p.15 [Accessed 26 June 2017]. 
71 This represents an alternative outcome for the purposes of this article. The full details are available: http://www 
.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2016/index.htm, full report, p.15 [Accessed 26 June 2017]. 
72 See http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2016/index.htm, full report, p.12 [Accessed 26 June 2017]. 
73 This represents an alternative outcome for the purposes of this article. The full details are available: http://www 
.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2016/index.htm, full report, p.12 [Accessed 26 June 2017]. 
74 Home Office, Victims of modern slavery: Competent Authority guidance (2016), p.29. 75 Home Office, Victims of 
modern slavery: Competent Authority guidance (2016), p.29. 76 Home Office, Victims of modern slavery: Competent 
Authority guidance (2016), p.29. 
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violence”.78 Amendments to the partial defences, and the substitution of provocation 
with loss of control designed to accommodate victims of family violence who kill has 
by default rendered the partial defences potentially available to a broader category 
of vulnerable offender. 
In most trafficking/family violence victim claims, the power imbalance in the 
relationship is likely to mean that circumstances in which these killings occur in 
spontaneous confrontations will be rare, as victims may wait until their “more 
powerful” exploiter is off-guard and/or resort to the use of a weapon, rendering 
self-defence inapplicable. The concepts of imminence and proportionality are 
criticised for working against vulnerable individuals who are more likely to wait 
until their exploiter/abuser is off-guard, in contrast to physically stronger aggressors 
who “can afford” to attack a smaller and weaker victim.79 Where self-defence may be 
relevant, self-defence should take precedence over partial defences.80 
The qualifying triggers may be regarded sufficient to accommodate some 
trafficking victims who kill an exploiter, but the triggers remain “self-evidently 
exclusionary insofar as they seek to exclude any cause of the loss of control that 
falls outside of their purview”.81 Given the torture and threats experienced by 
Adelaide, and beatings suffered by Paul each could claim they feared serious 
violence (“fear trigger”)82 for the purposes of the loss of control defence. The fear 
trigger was introduced to accommodate the circumstances of victims of domestic 
abuse, but it is not limited to cases involving a familial link. Whether the defendant 
feared serious violence engages an entirely subjective enquiry.83 The fear trigger, 
which applies where “D’s loss of self-control was attributable to D’s fear of serious 
violence from V against D or another identified person”84 might have enabled a 
partial defence to be run in some duress contexts, but for the limitation that violence 
emanates from the victim.85 For Sanyu and Holly the fear of serious violence does 
not emanate from the ultimate victim, but from the trafficker. 
A generous interpretation of the fear trigger in third party contexts might apply, 
for example, where V had threatened to instruct a third party to kill D, or where X 
reports that V was armed with a knife or a gun and was going to kill D.86 This 
approach to indirect qualifying triggers may be likened to the law on indirect 
threats in duress. Gross LJ, in Brandford explained that an indirect threat may be 
“very real”.87 For example, a threat to “D and her family by a messenger from an 
organised crime group, conveying a threat from a “crime boss” or the equivalent 
passing on of a threat from an emissary of a terrorist group”.88 For the purposes of 
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the defence, whether the threat is direct or indirect is less important than, inter alia, 
its “immediacy, imminence [and] the possibility of taking evasive action”.89 
The result is that, unlike duress, loss of control does not automatically extend to 
the killing of innocent third parties because of compulsion arising from 
exploitation, but it is not precluded from doing so. The Law Commission explained that 
this was “not a policy judgement that such an individual should never be entitled to 
a defence”, but this category of case was simply beyond the scope of the review.90 
The “seriously wronged trigger” applies to a thing said or done or both which 
constitute circumstances of an extremely grave character which may induce a 
justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.91 In contrast to the fear trigger, the 
seriously wronged trigger does not specify that the “thing said or done” should 
emanate from the victim,92 and although academics have been critical of the 
suggestion that an individual may feel wronged by circumstances,93 there remains 
the possibility that the thing said or done could emanate from sources extraneous 
to the victim, for example, from a trafficker and/or from being trafficked. Slavery 
undeniably constitutes a thing said or done or both which constitute circumstances 
of an extremely grave character which may induce a justifiable sense of being 
seriously wronged.94 The cumulative impact95 of the forced prostitution, coercion, 
and threats experienced by Adelaide and Holly, the threats experienced by Sanyu, 
and the control and coercion Paul experienced from his “adoptive family” would 
also be likely to satisfy this requirement. Although there is the potential that the 
defence may be available in this context, it is more likely that Sanyu and Holly were 
acting out of fear rather than in response to a justified sense of being seriously 
wronged. 
Other problems pervade the loss of control defence. Retention of a controversial 
loss of self-control requirement has been heavily criticised.96 The Law Commission was 
of the view that it was better to render the defence unavailable where the 
defendant acted in a considered desire for revenge rather than retain the requirement 
that the loss of self-control had to be sudden as under the old law.97 The inherent 
unfairness of the suddenness requirement in cases of domestic abuse was illustrated 
in, inter alia, Ahluwalia,98 and Thornton.99 This unfairness led to the recognition of 
the “slow burn” concept that victims of abuse were unlikely to respond 
immediately to provocation, and instead the suffering experienced would gradually 
build until an objectively ostensibly trivial incident may constitute the final straw 
causing the defendant to kill following a prolonged campaign of abuse.100 Relaxation 
89 Brandford [2016] EWCA Crim 1794; [2017] 4 W.L.R. 17; [2017] 1 Cr. App. R. 14 (p.197) at [39]. 
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of the suddenness requirement so that cumulative provocation was relevant 
represented an imperfect compromise designed to accommodate circumstances of 
abused defendants,101 while preventing misuse of the defence in gang-related 
contexts.102 However, the experiences of victims of domestic violence were still 
required to fit the parameters of a defence more suited to those who exhibited 
angry, violent responses to conduct rather than those who, living in a state of 
perpetual fear, responded when their abuser was off-guard.103 
Maintaining loss of self-control at the heart of the reformulated partial defence 
has meant that there is less likely to be a need for courts to deny the defence on 
the basis that D acted from a considered desire for revenge, since many cases are 
filtered out prior to consideration of the exclusion. It has also resulted in a more 
liberal interpretation of the loss of self-control requirement.104 The effect is that loss 
of self-control may amount to “loss of the ability to act in accordance with 
considered judgment or a loss of normal powers of reasoning”.105 Despite this 
apparant neutralisation of the loss of self-control requirement, it is likely to prove 
difficult for an individual to claim a loss of self-control following an assertion that 
their response was proportionate in the circumstances for the purposes of self-
defence.106 For Sanyu and Holly, their reluctance to engage with the demands of the 
traffickers may make it difficult to establish a loss of self-control. 
The loss of control defence is restricted by the further limbs requiring comparison 
with the ordinary person and subsections stipulating that the defence is not available 
in cases of self-induced provocation, where the defendant acted in a considered 
desire for revenge, or on the basis that no jury, properly directed, could reasonably 
conclude that the defence might apply.107 
The loss of control defence, although not automatically excluded in the context of 
third party killings, was not designed for such purposes. The Law Commission 
explained that the objective test should filter out third party killing cases, save in 
the context of accident and mistake.108 According to the Law Commission, “[n]o 
person of ordinary tolerance and self-restraint would deliberately respond to 
provocation by one person by using violence against another”,109 but Sanyu and 
Holly’s responses present a more difficult case because their responses were 
arguably understandable in the circumstances. There is a significant difference 
between the cases of Sanyu and Holly and other third party killing cases where the 
defence should clearly remain unavailable, for example, where, “X walks in on Y 
raping his daughter. X loses control and tries to attack Y only to be stopped 
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by a friend, whom he kills” for trying to stop him.110 It is essential that a bespoke 
partial defence for those who kill in response to compulsion is made available. 
Diminished responsibility may also be a relevant defence given that exposure to 
slavery may induce mental ill health. In terms of mental illness, the World Health 
Organisation identifies psychological consequences of trafficking inclusive of 
depression, as in Paul’s case, post-traumatic stress disorder and related anxiety 
disorders.111 Paul may be able to claim diminished responsibility. In Adelaide’s case, 
battered spousal syndrome may potentially form the basis of a diminished 
responsibility claim, but the utility of battered spousal syndrome is doubted, and 
reliance on “PTSD or other medical conditions might be preferable.”112 Requiring 
domestic violence victims who kill to rely on diminished responsibility rather than 
provocation, such as occurred in the case of Ahluwalia,113 was heavily criticised for 
pathologising the victim’s response, when the reaction may be regarded 
understandable in the circumstances.114 It is worth noting that, diminished 
responsibility would also potentially be available to Sanyu and Holly were they 
suffering from a recognised medical condition at the time of the killing. 
A slavery victim who kills their exploiter may be eligible to claim loss of control or 
diminished responsibility, despite both defences potentially having a weaker moral 
excusatory claim to murder than duress, given the actor under external pressures 
has killed to protect innocent life and avert harm.115 This will depend upon the 
circumstances given that loss of control might be close to justified self-defence 
(excessive self-defence), and an individual operating under diminished responsibility 
may perceive the circumstances as being equivalent to duress in some cases, yet 
loss of control and diminished responsibility are not limited to the aversion of harm 
predicated on external pressures. 
 
A new partial defence 
The absence of a duress defence in “hard choice” situations like that of Sanyu and 
Holly is “simply indefensible”, and the logic that a partial defence ought to be 
available is “irresistible”.116 The Law Commission has revisited the issue of whether 
duress should provide a defence to murder on several occasions, most recently 
advancing an absolute defence.117 During Parliamentary debate on the 2015 Act, 
Mark Durkan, then MP (SDLP), argued that s.45 should extend to all offences.118 This 
would have aligned s.45 to the equivalent Trinidad and Tobago Trafficking in 
Persons Act that provides an absolute defence for victims of trafficking who 
commit offences because of being trafficked.119 Most consultees to the Law 
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Commission’s paper to favour duress as a defence to murder believed it should be a 
partial defence.120 The Joint Committee also recommended a partial defence for 
slavery/trafficking victims who kill.121 Three options arise from the Law Commission; 
the Joint Committee; and, the enactment of s.45. 
 
The Law Commission’s recommendations 
In the context of the Law Commission’s earlier recommendations to introduce 
“individuated offences of homicide, and partial defences to murder … within a 
graduated system or hierarchy of offences”,122 the Commission advocated that 
duress should provide a partial defence to first degree murder, resulting in a finding of 
second degree murder.123 D must have reasonably believed he or she or someone for 
whom he or she is responsible was being threatened with death or life threatening 
harm.124 In assessing whether a person of reasonable firmness would have acted as 
the defendant did, the jury may consider the circumstances of D including his age, 
but not those bearing on his capacity to withstand duress.125 The threat need not be 
objectively life threatening,126 but D’s view of the nature of the threat or 
circumstances must be reasonably held.127 The prosecution would retain the burden 
of disproving the defence.128 
The Law Commission’s proposed defence of duress to first degree murder, while 
preferable to the current position, would prove problematic for trafficking victims 
who kill. The concept of life threatening harm is “vague and ambiguous”,129 and 
s.45 provides statutory recognition that it is “inherently contradictory” to excuse 
based on threats, but not circumstances.130 Taking account of circumstances in 
assessing the reasonable person potentially invites judicial flexibility in relation to 
“relevant” factors, but the exclusion of factors bearing on D’s capacity to withstand 
duress is purposely restrictive. The recommendation is considerably narrower in 
scope than the current objective test for duress, where sex,131 age, psychiatric 
disorder, recognised medical conditions and serious physical disability132 are relevant.133 
Battered spousal syndrome is potentially relevant but this is heavily circumscribed 
and applies only where the victim suffers from a very “extreme form” of the 
syndrome.134 The Law Commission argued that exclusion of individual 
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characteristics is less problematic in murder cases, since diminished responsibility 
provides an alternative partial defence.135 
 
The Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Modern Slavery Bill 
The Joint Committee recommended that any partial defence for slavery/trafficking 
victims who kill should adopt the “ordinary person” test operating under loss of 
control. The Joint Committee’s partial defence would reduce murder to 
manslaughter where the killing is “a direct and immediate result” of being a victim of 
several specified offences, including, inter alia, trafficking and slavery, and 
“a person of the same sex and age as the accused, with a normal degree of 
tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of the accused, might have 
reacted in the same or in a similar way.”136 
Under the loss of control defence the circumstances of D are excluded from the 
jury’s consideration where their only relevance is that they bear upon the 
defendant’s capacity for tolerance and self-restraint. The “only” qualifier injects a 
layer of judicial flexibility into the assessment of circumstances to be considered. For 
example, Lord Judge CJ noted, obiter, that alcoholism may be a relevant 
circumstance for the purposes of the objective test where D is mercilessly taunted 
about the condition to the extent it amounts to a qualifying trigger.137 This judicial 
flexibility in the ordinary person test, potentially renders the Joint Committee’s test 
broader in scope than the recommendations of the Law Commission, considered 
above, which would exclude any conditions bearing upon D’s capacity to withstand 
duress. It is submitted that the broader approach to the ordinary person test is 
preferable, since this might allow individual vulnerabilities of the defendant to be 
considered, where relevant. 
The “public policy”138 argument that a broader ordinary person test might be 
exploited by serious criminals can be met through the minimum threat level required in 
order to engage the defence. Compulsion arising from slavery and specified forms 
of exploitation could meet that standard. The relevant circumstances to which the 
jury are to have regard when assessing the reasonableness of D’s response should be 
directed at the reasonableness of any options to avert the threat.139 The “no realistic 
alternative” requirement under the Law Commission’s duress proposals is preferable 
to the Joint Committee’s approach that the offence constituted an immediate 
response to the threat. The circumstances of the exploitation are likely to be 
ongoing so the better question to ask is whether there was a reasonable or realistic 
alternative to neutralise or avert the threat.140 The “no realistic alternative” 
requirement will often, in practical terms, relate to the immediacy of the threat and 
the temporal divide between the threat and the commission of the offence since 
lack of immediacy might imply opportunity to avert/neutralise the threat. The 
realistic alternative approach does not assess D’s perception, but whether a 
135 The Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006). 
136 Joint Committee, Draft Modern Slavery Bill Report (2013–2014). 
137 Asmelash [2013] EWCA Crim 157; [2014] Q.B. 103; [2013] 1 Cr. App. R. 33. 
138 Graham [1982] 1 All E.R. 801, 806. 
139 Smith, “Duress and Steadfastness: In Pursuit of the Unintelligible” [1999] Crim. L. Rev. 366, 370 and 375. 
140 See, generally, Hudson [1971] 2 Q.B. 202; (1972) 56 Cr. App. R. 1. 
  
“reasonable person” would have identified a “realistic alternative”.141 What may be 
regarded a “realistic alternative” to a juror may appear entirely counterintuitive to a 
victim of slavery. Like a victim of domestic abuse, the victim of slavery may fear that 
alerting the authorities, attempting to escape or trying to avoid the situation will put 
them or their families in greater danger. A sensible approach must be adopted in 
recognising that the objective assessment ought to be made in the context of the 
trafficking situation, and age ought to be relevant. 
In requiring the killing to be a direct result of the exploitation suffered, the Joint 
Committee’s recommendations are closely aligned to duress, which requires the 
act to be a direct result of the threats, and to s.45 that applies where D committed 
the relevant act as a direct consequence of the exploitation.142 
 
Extending s.45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 
An alternative option would be to extend s.45 to murder as a partial defence. 
Section 45 engages a reverse burden of proof (beyond disproving victim status). An 
objection to expansion of duress in Dao was the difficulty prosecutors would have 
in disproving the defence.143 A defence might consist of “little more than assertions, 
only expanded upon at trial”.144 This issue might been mitigated by legislative 
requirements regarding defence disclosure.145 In practical terms, forcing D to reveal 
the nature of the defence early is likely to be of little assistance in preventing the 
fabrication of a defence in most cases. 
The reverse burden is preferable in addressing the concerns outlined in Dao.146 
The prosecution would still be required to disprove trafficking status, and prove the 
constituent elements of the offence charged. The defendant would be required to 
prove compulsion on the balance of probabilities.147 Compulsion or duress is likely 
to take place separately to the offence charged; the person making the threat and 
the ultimate victim are likely to be different people; and the ultimate victim may 
not be present when the threat is made. This will often result in D being the “sole 
source” of defence evidence, and D may give testimony, which the prosecution 
cannot compel.148 Sources external to D, particularly in the human trafficking 
context where the threat may emanate from another jurisdiction and relate to 
children or relatives residing elsewhere, may be difficult to locate.149 The reverse 
burden also reduces the “desire” to retain the stringent reasonable person 
 
141 See, for example, Van Dao [2012] EWCA Crim 1717. 
142 Modern Slavery Act 2015 s.45(2)(b) and (5). Compulsion is also attributable to slavery or to relevant exploitation if— it 
is, or is part of, conduct which constitutes an offence under s.1 or conduct which constitutes relevant exploitation; 
s.45(2)(a). 
143 The Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences Against the Person and General Principles 
(1993), para.30.15 quoting Lord Lane in Howe [1986] Q.B. 626 at 641. 
144 Van Dao [2012] EWCA Crim 1717 at [45], referring to Lord Bingham in Z: Duress is “peculiarly difficult for the 
prosecution to investigate and disprove beyond reasonable doubt;” [2005] UKHL 22, [2005] 2 A.C. 467; [2005] 
2 Cr. App. R. 22 (p.314) at [20]. 
145 The Law Commission, A New Homicide Act for England and Wales? (2005). 
146 Law Com 218 paras 30.16 and 33.1–33.16. 
147 The Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006), para.6.108. All members of the judiciary who 
responded to the Law Commission Consultation were of the view that a reverse burden for duress would not offend 
art.6(2) ECHR: at para.6.94. 
148 The Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006), paras 6.104 and 6.108. 
149 The Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006), para.6.107. Note, trafficking may occur over 
a short distance and is not limited to cross border travel; Rehman [2017] EWCA Crim 106. 
  
standard, allowing consideration of a broader range of circumstances/creditable 
characteristics.150 
The reverse burden would also assist in addressing Lord Thomas CJ’s concern 
that false claims are easy to assert and difficult to disprove. In the absence of a 
reverse burden, it remains possible for an individual to concoct a false claim of 
duress where the prosecution is unable to disprove voluntary gang membership.151 
Caution is urged here on the basis that it is often difficult to identify victims, and 
engagement with a trafficking organisation may be perceived as voluntary when 
the victim is being exploited. 
The current law excludes the duress defence involving inter-gang-related 
threats:152 “nothing should turn on foresight of the way, in the event, the dominant 
party chooses to exploit the defendant’s subservience. There need not be foresight 
of coercion to commit crimes”.153 The s.45 defence does not apply such an exclusion 
presumably because in most cases victim status has been established through the 
Competent Authority, however such a decision is not binding on the court154 and 
the Court of Appeal has already refused to admit expert evidence based “almost 
entirely on the applicant’s own account”.155 Another reason could be that victims of 
trafficking may have exposed themselves to the risk to commit a criminal offence. 
A voluntary association exclusion would apply to the proposed partial defence 
which assesses whether the individual foresaw the risk of threats “of such severity, 
plausibility and immediacy that one might be compelled to do that which one 
would otherwise have chosen not to do”.156 The defence ought to apply where there is 
a “reasonable excuse” for the voluntary exposure. 157 This would provide flexibility 
in cases akin to Adelaide’s, for example,158 while avoiding an “unworkable” 
requirement of foresight of the nature of the offence one might be compelled to 
commit.159 For those under the age of 18, this assessment should be undertaken by 
reference to the individual’s age. The test is objective, and the practical reality is 
that in circumstances where a jury would reasonably perceive a risk, and in the 
absence of a legitimate excuse, jurors are unlikely to believe the defendant did not 
foresee the risk.160 The voluntary association exclusion is needed to filter out 
unmeritorious claims, but a careful balancing exercise ought to take place to ensure 
that the defence is not excluded to those like Sanyu and Holly who may have a 
reasonable excuse for their voluntary exposure. 
 
 
 
150 Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 A.C. 467; [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 22 (p.314) at [74] 
151 The Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006), para.6.109. 
152 Z [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 A.C. 467; [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 22 (p.314). 
153 Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 A.C. 467; [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 22 (p.314) at [38] per Lord Bingham. 
154 Joseph [2017] EWCA Crim 36; [2017] 1 Cr. App. R. 33 (p.486) at [20] and [38]. 
155 Joseph [2017] EWCA Crim 36; [2017] 1 Cr. App. R. 33 (p.486) at [67]. 
156 Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 A.C. 467; [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 22 (p.314) at [77] per Baroness Hale 
(dissenting). 
157 Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 A.C. 467; [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 22 (p.314) at [77] per Baroness Hale 
(dissenting). 
158 The Law Commission, Report on Defences of General Application (1977), Law Com No.83, para.2.37. 
159 Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 A.C. 467; [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 22 (p.314) at [77] per Baroness Hale. 
160 Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 A.C. 467; [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 22 (p.314) at [38] per Lord Bingham. 
  
A new partial defence 
To summarise, the proposed partial defence would apply to murder only. As per 
s.45, the prosecution bears the burden of disproving trafficking status to the usual 
criminal standard. Thereafter, the defendant bears the burden of proving the defence 
on the balance of probabilities. The act or omission in doing or being a party to the 
killing must be a direct result of compulsion attributable to relevant exploitation. 
Compulsion may arise from another person or individuated circumstances. The 
term exploitation includes: slavery, servitude, and forced or compulsory labour; 
human trafficking; sexual exploitation; removal of organs; securing services by 
force, fraud or deception; and, securing services by children or vulnerable 
individuals.161 The jury must be satisfied that a person of ordinary tolerance and 
self-restraint in the same situation would have had no realistic alternative to doing 
the act. The jury may consider the age and circumstances of the defendant, but not 
those bearing only on his capacity to withstand compulsion. The defence would be 
unavailable in cases involving voluntary exposure, without reasonable excuse, to 
the risk of exploitation where the defendant ought reasonably to have foreseen the 
risk of compulsion to do that which one would otherwise have chosen not to do.162 
A variant would apply to those under 18 repudiating the compulsion, and the no 
realistic alternative requirements. The normal person test and voluntary association 
assessments must be undertaken by reference to the age of the defendant. The 
defence aligns with s.45, except for the broader “ordinary person” test, and 
voluntary association exclusion. This departure is justified on grounds that a more 
subjectivised approach embracing circumstances/creditable characteristics is 
mandated, given the impact of slavery/trafficking on the victim, and that the victim 
may be selected because of vulnerabilities. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The introduction of s.45 and the case of Joseph provides an opportunity to consider 
afresh the debate regarding whether a defence based upon compulsion ought to 
be available in murder cases. Many of the issues raised in this article in relation to 
trafficking victims who kill may apply outwith the trafficking scenario: for example, 
in intimate partner violence, domestic violence,163 and third party abuse contexts, 
amongst others.164 The preference should always be for general (partial) defences, 
wherever possible, to ensure that vulnerable individuals in like situations are not 
unfairly excluded. The issue as to whether duress should provide a full or partial 
defence to murder has been revisited on several occasions, and the majority remain 
in favour of extending the defence. These proposals have not been afforded sufficient 
weight by Parliament. 
The recommendation of an entirely bespoke statutory defence for trafficking 
victims who commit certain offences introduces a new argument in favour of a 
partial defence based on compulsion. Given prior victim-status must be established 
161 See the definitions provided under Modern Slavery Act 2015, s.3. See, generally, s.45(2)(a)–(b) and (5). For 
discussion see, J. Collins, “Exploitation of persons and the limits of the criminal law” (2017) Crim. L.R. 169. 
162 Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 A.C. 467; [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 22 (p.314) at [77] per Baroness Hale. 
163 See, for example, W [2007] EWCA Crim 1251; [2007] 2 Cr. App. R. 31 (p.411). 
164 For further discussion see, N. Wake and A. Reed, “Re-conceptualsing the contours of self-defence in the context of 
vulnerable offenders: a response to the New Zealand Law Commission” (2016) 3(2) J.I.C.L. 195. 
  
for the purposes of the partial defence, and the Competent Authority and CPS are 
already charged with making such determinations, the proposed defence would sit 
neatly alongside s.45.165 The recommendations for an alternative approach to young 
people should also be welcomed but it is recognised that ad hoc allowances for 
young people are not ideal, and reconsideration of the Law Commission's work on 
developmental immaturity in the context of defences would be beneficial.166 The 
proposed defence in its current form would go some way to prevent the injustice 
that the absence of a duress defence for murder creates in trafficking contexts.167 
There remain, however, strong arguments in favour of introducing duress as a full168 
or partial defence169 to murder, and a variant on the above defence focusing on 
compulsion and exploitation could be developed. 
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